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THE EcoNoMics OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION. By Irston R. Barnes.
New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1942. Pp. xxiv, 952. $5.00.
THE distinctive character of this new textbook on public utility regulation
lies neither in its organization of material, which follows a fairly standardized
outline, nor in its statement of principles and of public policy, which accords
generally with "the best liberal thought" of current writers. Instead, the auth-
or's real contribution is his skillful combination of a broad survey with a
wealth of detail and of concrete illustration. The detail is carefully selected,
accurately presented, and of sufficient importance to interest the specialist if
not the casual reader. To a far greater extent than do the shorter texts,
Barnes's treatise portrays the true complexities of modern utility regulation
as well as the significant variations among the different jurisdictions of the
nation.
Following a well established precedent of textbook writers, Barnes begins
with a chapter on The Public Utility Concept, devoted largely to a review of
the legal cases on businesses "affected with a public interest" and noting
recent decisions which reduce the force of the traditional distinction between
a public and a private calling. In presenting the "theories" by which various
writers have rationalized the power of the government to regulate the price.4
and services of particular businesses, Barnes gives qualified approval to the
"social disadvantage theory," which "finds the ultimate sanction for regulation
in the welfare of society rather than in the protection of individuals." I Un-
fortunately, the author fails to make clear just what distinction he has in mind
between the welfare of society and the welfare of the individuals within that
society. In default of such an explicit distinction, I am at a loss to attach any
definite meaning to the "social disadvantage theory" of regulation.
Chapters II to IV review the history and the economic characteristics of
public utilities, including an excellent chapter on corporate structures tinder
the domination of the holding company. The subject of regulation is then
introduced by three chapters: on state and federal jurisdiction; on the instru-
ments of regulation (the legislature, the judiciary, and the commission) ; and
on franchises. As a layman, after reading Barnes's discussion of the case
law on state versus federal jurisdiction, I remain confused on the nicer aspects
of the dispute. Perhaps, however, the confusion lies in the case law itself.
The treatment of rate regulation is preceded by a chapter on the control of
accounting, with special reference to accounting for depreciation, The.recent
trend away from the use of mere, arbitrarily determined, retirement reserves
to systematic accounting for accrued depreciation is supported by the author,
whose views on wise regulatory policy with respect to depreciation as a factor
in rate making seem fair and sensible. On the theoretical side, however, the
author's discussion, like that of all other writers in the field (including the
present reviewer), is inadequate. Barnes, for example, appears to accept, as
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valid for rate making as well as for accounting purposes, the Federal Power
Commission's definition of depreciation as "the loss in service value not re-
stored by current maintenance, incurred in connection with the consumption
or prospective retirement of electric plant in the course of service from causes
which are known to be in current operation and against which the utility is
not protected by insurance." 2 But neither he nor the Federal Power Com-
mission has succeeded in defining that "service value," the loss of which is said
to constitute "depreciation."
When the term "depreciation" refers to something which must be deducted
from cost new in arriving at a rate base, the objection to identifying it with
loss in valve, however "value" be construed, is that the rate base itself is es-
sentially a cost category and not a value category in the minds of those who.
like Barnes, reject the standard of Synth v. Avies.3 If, then, the rate base
does not purport to measure the value of the property. why should one arrive
at it by deducting from cost new an allowance for a decline in value? More-
over, if "value" is outlawed as a rate base because of the familiar vicious-circle
objection (namely, that value depends on earning power, which in turn de-
pends on prospective rates), why should not depreciation likewise be outlawed
when used as a value concept?
In a later chapter, Barnes recognizes this fundamental difficulty of defini-
tion, by stating that "in utility regulation, depreciation is not simply a value
concept." 4 In this chapter he properly treats depreciation in terms of amor-
tizable cost rather than in terms of value decrement. Yet he does not com-
pletely abandon the value conception, for he now refers to depreciation in terms
of "lessening in cost value" 5 -a phrase which is self-contradictory on its face.
One other point in Barnes's discussion of depreciation may fairly be chal-
lenged, namely, his statement that the same considerations which underlie the
deduction of accrued depreciation from reproduction cost new, as a measure
of the rate base, apply also to its deduction from original cost.0 While Barnes
is almost certainly right in insisting that depreciation is properly deductible
in both instances, the reason why it is deductible from reproduction cost would
seem to be different from the reason why it is deductible from original cost.
Furthermore, the logic of a reproduction-cost rate base calls for a definition
of depreciation different from the definition appropriate under an original-cost
rate base. The space limits of this review, however, preclude an exposition of
this point, which I have discussed elsewhere at some length. 7
Chapters IX to XVIII are devoted directly to rate regulation, including an
extensive review and critique of the Supreme Court opinions on "fair value"
and on "reasonable rate of return." Well done as this survey of the legal pre-
cedents is, I question whether so much space should be given to it in a treatise
written primarily from the standpoint of an economist. Much of what the
2. P. 256.
3. 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
4. P. 477.
5. Pp. 478, 490.
6. P. 408.
7. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937) 1137-10.
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courts have said about the principles of rate regulation is now so clearly be-
yond the pale of scientific thought and reasonable controversy that it is hardly
worth reading unless it still reflects authoritative law. The attempt to master
the intricacies of these judicial pronouncements is likely to leave both the
author and the reader with inadequate time to analyze the many, complex prob-
lems in the economics of rate making that are still the proper subject of dis-
pute among experts. Barnes's treatise suffers in this respect, for it treats only
summarily the more difficult and more important economic aspects of rate
theory, such as the proposed principle of charges made equal only to marginal
cost s or the relative merits of alternative measures of the demand charge.0
Each one of these problems of "applied economic theory," along with a num-
ber of others, deserves a long, separate chapter in an advanced study of the
economics of rate regulation.
On the nature of the rate base, Barnes agrees with other economists that
"present value," in the businessman's sense of the word "value," must be
rejected on logical grounds. Indeed, recent cases suggest the likelihood that
the Supreme Court itself will soon expressly take a similar position. One
point, however, deserves more consideration than it has received from critics
of the "fair value" doctrine. That is whether "value" rather than mere "cost"
might qualify as a rate base if it were to be identified, not with the commercial
value of the property to its owners, but rather with the potential value of the
assets to the community. So construed, the acceptance of "value" as a rate
base would not run afoul of the vicious-circle objection to market value, al-
though it would be subject to other objections that might well be fatal from
a practical standpoint. I raise this point, not with the idea that "value to
the community" demands acceptance as a rate base alternative to that of the
Smyth v. Ames doctrine, but rather by way of accounting for the refusal of
many intelligent people, including many judges, to accept the frequent asser-
tion of appraisers that the value of a public utility property is a mere reflec-
tion of its earning power. In refusing to accept a capitalized-earnings concep-
tion of value, may they not be thinking in terms of the potential value of an
electric plant or of a railroad system to the people of the community who bene-
fit, directly or indirectly, from its services? Such a value is indeed no mere
expression of anticipated corporate income.
The relative merits of original cost and of reproduction cost as the chief
determinant of the rate base-a subject of long-standing debate among lawyers
and economists-are discussed at length in Chapters XII, XIII, and XIV.
Although the author himself gives the honors to original cost, he presents well
and fairly the defense of a rate base which rises and falls with changing con-
struction costs. However, he has failed to mention one serious fallacy in the
theoretical case for reproduction cost. The fallacy lies in a failure to recognize
that the economic advantage which is claimed for a reproduction-cost rate base
(namely, that it would result in rates high enough, but not too high, to induce
consumers to make the optimum use of public services) is an advantage which





additional unit cost of supplying more service, without reference to overhead
costs. Indeed, Hotelling and other economists to whom Barnes refers,' 0
accept the full logic of this position by proposing that utility rates be set at
marginal cost and that any resulting deficits be paid for by governmental sub-
sidies. But the reproduction-cost rate base, while it avoids the need for a
subsidy, also misses the very objective that is supposed to constitute its great
charm from the standpoint of orthodox economic theory.
The chapter on The Rate of Return makes good use of the two excellent
studies of the subject prepared by Carl I. Wheat and published in 1938 by
the Federal Communications Commission. Barnes rightly notes the lack of
clarity in the judicial pronouncements as to a "reasonable" rate of return;
and he also notes that some of these pronouncements, such as that of the
Supreme Court in the Bluejteld case,"' seem more germane to a commission's
search for an economically sound rate of return than to a court's inquiry as to
whether the rate which a commission has already allowed is "confiscatory."
He also calls attention to the marked incongruity between the criteria discussed
by the courts in connection with valuation and the criteria discussed by the
same courts in connection with rates of return.
Believing that a fairly sharp distinction should be drawn between the idea
of a reasonable rate of return and the idea of a non-confiscatory rate, Barnes
would measure the former at whatever rate is required to attract the necessary
additional capital to the enterprise, while he would measure the latter at what-
ever rate is high enough to avoid a "withdrawal" of existing capital. But he
has difficulty in giving definite meaning to his phrase "withdra wal of capital,"
since the capital outlays for most public-utility assets are irretrievable costs
save for mere salvage value. With various qualifications, he concludes that
a proposed rate of return may be adjudged "reasonable" if it permits the
company's stock to sell at some 10 points above par (or above legitimate book
value); whereas it must be adjudged not only unreasonable but positively
"confiscatory" if its niggardliness brings the market price of common stock
persistently to 5 or 10 points below par value (or legitimate book value), and
if the resulting yield at which this stock will sell on the market is materially
higher than that characteristic of other similar securities.
These are ingenious suggestions. Yet I suspect that the distinctions which
they would draw between reasonable and confiscatory rates of return are too
subtle for practical application by the courts. If some distinction is called for,
as well it may be, there is much to be said for a simple rule that a rate of
return to be adjudged "confiscatory" must be found to be not only "unreason-
able," but outrageously unreasonable, or at least, "unreasonable beyond rea-
sonable doubt !"
Among the "alternatives to the present-value rate base" presented in Chap-
ter XVII, Barnes presents his own promising modification of the "prudent
investment" basis of rate regulation. A part of this program he adapts from
the Washington plan as applied to the electric company serving that city,
10. Pp. 586-88.
11. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm., 262 U. S.
679, 692 (1923).
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and another part from a proposed utility bill drafted by Dr. John Batter with
my assistance and presented in the Minority Report of the New York State
Commission on the Revision of the Public Service Commissions Laws,12
But Barnes would modify the provisions of the Washington plan by reserving
for consumers, to be applied to amortization of capital investment, half of any
excess earnings yielded by rates in effect in any given year. More important,
unlike other schemes of rate control which follow the "prudent investment"
principle, the rate of earnings on common stock equity would be left flexible
so that it could be made sufficient, in ordinary times, to permit the company to
attract new capital by the issuance of more common stock of the same class.
This provision, Barnes thinks, would go a long way toward removing what lie
deems the most serious defect of the prudent-investment plan-the difficulty
of selling common stock if the dividends on that stock are limited to a fixed
maximum rate.
After leaving the subject of rate control, the author first devotes a long
chapter to the regulation of holding companies before and after the passage
of the Federal Public Utility Act of 1935. The topic is well treated in such a
short space. But I am somewhat surprised to find no discussion of what is
perhaps the most critical economic problem in the entire realm of holding-
company regulation-namely, the case for or against a plan of integration
which will divorce the business of local distribution from the business of large-
scale generation and transmission. Apparently the draftsmen of the Holding
Company Act did not have in mind this type of reintegration. But in the light
of the experience of the British Grid System, the Ontario Hydro-Electric
System, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, the proposal to separate the
wholesale from the retail business of our private utility systems deserves care-
ful study.
On security regulation, to which all the standard textbooks devote a special
chapter, Barnes presents much fresh material originating largely with the
newer federal commissions-especially the Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion. The major new development in this aspect of regulation, I take it, has
been the recent refusal of some of the more aggressive commissions to "let
bygones be bygones" so far as concerns an improper existing capital structure.
Of course, there is a review of the recent controversy about competitive bid-
ding. Barnes also presents a first-rate discussion of the requirements of a
"balanced" capital structure.
A chapter on regulation of service standards is followed by one on the Fed-
eral Power Commission, which could have been materially enriched if the
author had been able to consult the subsequently published monograph on that
Commission by Robert D. Baum.13 What Barnes presents is merely such a
picture of activities and rulings as can be secured from the official reports of
the Commission itself. The more intimate facts about the Commission and
the extent and nature of its influence on the national power policies is missed
because of lack of data. Barnes notes that until the Commission was reorgan-
12. N. Y. Leg. Doc. No. 75 (1930) 241-422.




ized in 1930 it lacked the membership and the staff that could have enabled it
to perform its assigned functions adequately. But he might also have noted
that the whole social philosophy of the commissioners was changed as a result
of the change from the old-line Republican administrations of the post-war
period to the New Deal administration under Roosevelt. The recent clashes
of this federal commission with several state commissions, such as that of
New York, together with its successful cooperation with other state commis-
sions, would also be worth treating. Finally, I miss a discussion of the still
pending Niagara Falls Power Company license case, in the hearings on which
the Commission's early licenses were challenged as failing utterly to protect
the public interest.
From the standpoint of the political significance of private utility enterprise,
the most enlightening chapter is that which summarizes the Federal Trade
Commission's special report on propaganda of the utility corporations. This
is followed by the final chapter, a seventy-one page discussion of public owner-
ship, including not only municipal ownership but also the federal hydro-elec-
tric projects and the cooperatives sponsored by the Rural Electrification Ad-
ministration.
Very wisely, the author gives relatively little space to the familiar, abstract
debate on the merits of private versus public ownership. Both of these forms
of organization have their distinct advantages and disadvantages. Moreover,
both have so many possible variations that they cannot be discussed intelligent-
ly as if they presented merely two, definite alternatives. Largely under the
stimulus of the New Deal political philosophy, the 1930's marked the rise of a
period of experimentation with a number of variations in the field of public
ownership, and even of several variations in the field of regulated private
ownership. Down to date, as Barnes's discussion indicates, some of these
experiments, such as those of the federal multiple-purpose dams, the public
electricity districts and the rural cooperatives, have had results so promising
that the program deserves vigorous continuance.
One theoretical aspect of the problem of public development of multiple-
purpose dams seems to me to merit a more fundamental treatment in an eco-
nomic treatise than Barnes gives it; that is, the problem of joint-cost alloca-
tion, which is mentioned briefly in connection with the work of the Tennessee
Valley Authority.' 4 The three alternative theories of allocation noted by
Barnes 15 are by no ineans the only ones, and even their rationale is not ade-
quately discussed. There are two major schools of thought as to joint-cost
allocations. According to the first point of view, it is possible (at least in
theory) to find some formula for allocating joint costs which is logically valid
in the sense that only this one formula results in the "true" or "proper" allo-
cation. According to the second point of view, the very "jointness" nf a joint
cost makes it indivisible except by an arbitrary tour de force. Hence, save
under very unusual circumstances, there can be no such thing as any single,
rational allocation as against which all other possible allocations are irrational.
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allocations are utterly arbitrary in the worst sense of the word and hence that
they should never be attempted.
Reading between the lines, I surmise that Barnes would go a long way, at
least, toward conceding the arbitrary nature of any joint-cost allocation. But
the soundness of such a viewpoint is not obvious on its face; and a detailed
discussion in the light of modern economic analysis would be a welcome addi-
tion to an advanced treatise on public utility economics.
In concluding this review, let me note that the very excellence of the book
is what warrants the detailed criticisms that I have attempted here. The
treatise is likely to have such deserved influence on the future literature, that
a reviewer is justified in searching for limitations as well as in calling atten-
tion to its many virtues.
JAMES C. BONDRIGHrT t
TiaE IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXES. By Roswell Magill. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1943. Pp. ix, 218. $3.00.
IN Fortune magazine for January, 1938, there appeared an article entitled
"The Federal Tax System." The article was not really about the federal tax
system at all although it did include a little-finger-nail sketch of that system;
it was a modulated howl against the substantial taxation of American business.
"How heavy a tax burden can U. S. business bear? And for how long? . . .
there is a limit beyond which free business enterprise cannot pay taxes and be
free; beyond which the capitalist economy must fail." It happens that this
article, although unsigned, was the work of two men. The voice was Archi-
bald MacLeish's voice, but the hands were the hands of MacLeish's friend
who was then, briefly, Under Secretary of the United States Treasury. The
hands were the hands of Roswell Magill.
Five years have passed, and a book has just been published entitled Tic
Impact of Federal Taxes. This time both the voice and the hands are those
of one who is billed on the book's jacket, not as Professor of Law at Colum-
bia University, not as practising tax attorney in New Yor City, but as Former
Under Secretary of the Treasury. "A badly designed tax system . . . can
be a serious brake on incentive. Ours . . . is beginning to function as a
brake today," says page viii; "our corporation taxes are exceptionally heavy,"
says page 18; "the method of taxing corporate income is grossly unfair," says
page 19; "will there still be venture capital available for our enterprise sys-
tem ?" asks page 120; "American corporations seem to be caught in the great-
est financial pincer-movement in their history," says page 121. Etc. Mr.
Magill's melody lingers on.
It lingers on despite the fact that there is more to Mr. Magill's little book
than his old theme song. What the book amounts to is a roughly revised
t Professor of Finance, Columbia University.
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reprint of half a dozen of the author's old articles and speeches, larded out
with enough new stuff to stretch the whole to a little more than 200 small
pages. As a result, the book is a book in form only. There is no cohesion, no
continuity from chapter to chapter except the annoying continuity of fre-
quent repetition. Thus, the Horst case, the Hallock case and the Clifford case,
although all important cases, are scarcely so important as to warrant detailed
and almost identical discussion two times apiece-discussion so identical that,
for example, a relevant quotation from an earlier opinion appears both on
page 104 and on page 181. And although Mr. Justice Stone's quoted "philoso-
phy" in the Horst decision makes good reading on page 53, "the kernel of
Mr. justice Stone's philosophy" as quoted oil page 185 has a too familiar
ring. In fact, the only possible excuse for Mr. Magill's sixth chapter, a slightly
warmed-over second serving of what has come before, is to add thirty pages to
his book. It adds notling else.
Nor should the unwary layman be taken in by Mr. Magill's protestation in
his preface that his book is going to deal with "federal taxation in its broader
and more fundamental aspects"; that it "is not designed to compete with
treatises which interpret the law"; and again, in his first chapter, that "it
will be a pleasure to leave the exposition of these matters [technical legal
stuff] to the encyclopedic textbooks and tax services." Chapter II has 89
footnotes, all strictly legal; Chapter III has 150. Chapter VII is a tacked-on
procedural discussion of federal tax administration, of no conceivable inter-
est to anyone but a tax attorney. On page 87 appears the not atypical sen-
tence: "In general, a payment by a corporation to its officers or employees
has been treated as compensation, not as a gift, but payments by a successor
corporation to employees of the predecessor or by stockholders, who had just
sold their stock, to the corporate administrative staff have been regarded as
gifts,"--with three footnotes. Here indeed are the broader and more funda-
mental aspects of federal taxation.
Actually Mr. Magill would have done better to stick to his legal knitting
throughout, instead of branching off, as he does for about one-half the book,
on broader and more fundamental excursions. Far and away the best of his
work is embodied in the two chapters-one called The Income Tax on the
Family and the other Gift and Death Taxes-which, as the author frankly con-
cedes, are rehashes of old law review articles. In these Mr. Magill is com-
petent, thoroughly informed, and sound if not imaginative in his suggestion
of minor reforms. Yet even here he betrays a slant which is something less
than objective-which savors more of Fortune magazine than of a Former
Under Secretary of the Treasury. Thus, having earlier dismissed the results
of taxing state and municipal bond interest (which he approves) as "incon-
siderable"--not only from the standpoint of extra revenue but of "increased
tax equity"-he devotes page after page to the problems of the poor million-
aire who is anxious to leave his fortune to his family instead of to the gov-
ernment. Again, after earlier pointing out that, by taking full advantage of the
gift and estate tax exemptions, a man can easily turn over $100,000 to his
family completely free of federal taxes-and commenting that these two fed-
eral taxes along with the income tax make it almost impossible today to build
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up and transfer more than "a moderate estate"--Mr. Magill makes his point
crystal clear on page 91 by. labeling as "moderate" a net estate of half a
million dollars.
It is in the field of corporate taxation, however, that Mr. Magill really lets
go. "The two major corporation taxes-the normal tax and surtax on cor-
porate net income and the excess-profits tax-are fundamentally defective, and
the defects are emphasized by high rates." Here, on page 143, is the old fa-
miliar tune, and Mr. Magill rings all the changes. He repeats, not once but
three times, the Union League refrain about stocks being owned by the poor
as well as the rich so that big corporate taxes really soak the poor. "A recent
study of dividend distributions in 1940 indicates that 47 per cent of the total
payment was received by nonprofit institutions like hospitals, schools, and
churches, by persons with small incomes who did not file returns, or by per-
sons with net incomes of less than $5,000," says Mr., Magill on page 149-
without bothering to indicate that 53 per cent of the dividends, then, must
have gone to profit institutions and persons with incomes over $5,000. Those
persons, according to Mr. Magill's own figures on page 198, add up to less
than 1 per cent of the population, as contrasted to the more than 99 per cent
who receive a part of 47 per cent of corporate dividends. More significantly,
Mr. Magill nowhere states that about 20,000 persons, one-seventieth of 1 per
cent of the population, regularly collect more than one-third of all corporate
dividends which are paid to individuals; that ownership of corporate stock,
when it spreads wide, spreads paper-thin; and that, in consequence, a cor-
porate tax is essentially, although by no means exclusively, a tax on the rich.
Mr. Magill's chief indignation about the corporate income tax boils tip from
the fact that the same income is taxed again, without credits or deductions,
when it is paid out to individuals as dividends. "The result," he says on page
27, "is a tremendous double-tax burden on corporate income, greatly in ex-
cess of the taxes on any other form of income. This discrimination against
corporate income is perhaps the most serious offense against fairness in the
preseni tax law." Mr. Magill's point, not a new one, is a valid one. But it is
not nearly so valid as he would have it appear. And therein lies the essence
of my major quarrel with Mr. Magill.
Now Mr. Magill is a tax attorney, and he is no fool. He must know that
corporate income is not always taxed twice. He must know that it is not
taxed twice when it is retained and reinvested by the corporation instead of
being distributed as dividends. He must know, further, that this very fact
creates what is probably the biggest loophole in the income tax lawv-whereby
wealthy men who control large corporations, but not so closely as to conic
under the penalty provisions of the "personal holding company" tax, escape
the high brackets of the individual income tax by simply reinvesting and rein-
vesting their earnings without declaring dividends. He must know that this
practice holds a double advantage in that the tremendous increase in the value
of such investments, if they are held until death, is never taxed as capital
gain to anyone. He must know that the sole purpose of the undistributed-
profit tax of a few years ago was to put an end to this little game by forcing
the declaration of dividends-and that the undistributed-profit tax was wil-
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fully misrepresented to death, largely at the instigati-n of the wealthy men
whose game it had spoiled. He must know that. in the absence of an undis-
tributed-profit tax, almost the only way to hit these hoarded profits is with a
high corporate income tax, per se. He says none of these things, and, although
they are by no means a complete answer to what he does say, I am afraid
that, in omitting them, Mr. Magill is himself guilty of a "serious offense
against fairness."
Similarly, his diatribes against the "confiscatory" excess-profits tax bear
all the earmarks of special pleading. Meticulous to pounce on every minor
defect of the law which in any way works hardships on corporations, Mr.
MKagill has not a single harsh, or even mildly critical, word to t-ay albout the
law's most glaring flaw. This flaw happens to operate in favor of corpora-
tions-and it has already cost the federal treasury literally billions of dollars.
It is the alternative base, whereby every corporation, of its own sweet will.
is permitted to choose whether to compute its normal profits (and hence its
taxable excess profits) from past earnings or from its invested capital. 1%r.
Iagill may--and obviously does-approve, in all honesty, of this boon tu
corporate wealth. But in the light of his references to the British income tax
law when he likes the way it works, I do not see how he can, with any hon-
esty, keep from his readers the fact that Great Britain's excess-profits tax
contains no alternative base whatever. Nor do I see how he can say, on page
190, that our 90 per cent excess-profit tax rates "have already reached a
peak" without at least a passing mention of the British rate of 10 per cent.
Although it is the striking omission of relevant material tending to counter
his own conclusions which will most deeply disturb any informed reader who
does not share Mr. Magil's prejudices, perhaps the best comment on his
persistent and tender solicitude for corporate wedth lies in a little table of facts
published by the New York Herald Tribune some weeks ago. The table
shows that total corporate profits for 1942, after payment of all taxes, were
23 per cent higher than in the boom year of 1940, and 300 per cent higher
than in 1938--the year when 'Mr. iagill expressed indirectly in Fortune
magazine his concern about the impact of federal taxes on the future of Ameri-
can business. And if-in the face of facts like these-the same man is still
concerned about the same thing today, it is not too surprising. For it seems
to me that the author of The Impact of Federal Taxes was not really Former
Under Secretary Magill of the United States Treasury and was not really
Professor Magill of Columbia University. It was Roswell ,Magill, Esq., of
the New York Bar.
FRED RODELL
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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BRACTONIAN PROBLEMS. By H. Kantorowicz. Glasgow: Jackson, Son and
Co., 1941. Pp. 133.
THIs is a posthumous publication, under the editorship of Mrs. F. M. Sten-
ton, of the first draft of a lecture which the author, at the time of his death,
was preparing for delivery in the University of Glasgow. The main portion
of the work is given over to a consideration of the Roman law element in those
small portions of Bracton's lengthy treatise drawn more or less verbatim from
Roman and Romanesque sources. The primary object of the writer is to show
that Bracton was not the uninstructed Romanist that some of his critics have
called him.
The first chapter after the introduction restates the none too numerous
known facts of Bracton's life. Following this is a chapter which is devoted to
a discussion of the date of the treatise. Maitland believed that Bracton wrote
his book, or the larger part of it at least, in the decade 1250-60. Although
this opinion has been generally accepted, Dr. Kantorowicz contends that Brac-
ton began to write at least as early as 1239. The preface to the De Legibus and
the materia in the Surnina Aurea of William of Drogheda are, in parts, much
alike. Hitherto it has been supposed that Bracton borrowed from the Sumzma,
but Dr. Kantorowicz maintains that William borrowed from Bracton. Then,
he argues, as William had begun to write by 1239, and would probably have
written his preface on beginning the Sunmma, Bracton must have written his
introduction at least as early as that same year. This leads to a still further
conclusion. At the very beginning of his work Bracton informs us that lie
is going to draw on old judgments, vetera hudicia, for his material. At one
place or another in his text he cites a large number of cases from the years
1217-40. These, and the laws of their time which they represent, have always
been regarded as the vetera hidicia to which Bracton refers in his preface. Dr.
Kantorowicz can not believe that if Bracton had begun to write as early as
1239, he would have regarded such recent cases as vetera hudicia. He then con-
cludes that "the ancients to whom he looks up in reverence must therefore be
those to whom we still do the same: the Romans." 1 It is most difficult to
accept such a conclusion in view of the context in which Bracton speaks of
the vetera hdicia. He emphasizes the difference between the written lees of
the civil law and the unwritten laws and customs of England. He points out
that in England the legal customs vary from place to place, so that in differ-
ent counties, cities, boroughs and towns, it will always be necessary to ascer-
tain what the custom of the place is and how it is applied. Since laws and
customs of this sort are often misapplied by unlearned men who sit in judg-
ment, Bracton says he has diligently examined the vetera iudicia of upright
men, and whatever he has found worthy of note he has gathered together in
one book for the instruction of at least the younger generation. Throughout
this section of his text Bracton clearly seems to be thinking of the unwritten
laws and customs of England, rather than of the written leges of the civil law.
In his fourth chapter Dr. Kantorowicz develops what he rightly calls his




the early Dc Legibus folios, where Bracton is quoting verbatim from Roman
sources or is depending largely upon them. is far from acceptable. This is not
because of any failure on the part of the manuscripts to agree as to what the
text should be. They do agree and they stand solidly behind the troublesome
passages, indicating that the common ancestor of all the extant manuscripts
must have contained these same readings. Dr. Kantorowicz will not believe,
as scholars hitherto have, that the textual defects are Bracton's own. He de-
fends Bracton as being thoroughly versed in Roman law, cites an instance of
what he terns "his surpassing skill in the use of Roman terminology," and
even goes to such an extreme length as to say that the definition of miurlna,
as given by Bracton, "is more meticulously correct than that given by the
Romans themselves and the most learned modern Romanists." 2 Convinced
that Bracton was too learned a civilian to have writtcn the Roman law pas-
sages just referred to, he believes that the common ancestor of the P,racton
manuscripts could not have been Bracton's own copy of his work, because
that copy, in his opinion, would have been free from textual mistakes. As a
result of this conclusion he is faced with the problem of finding some answer
to the question of who did write the text if Bracton did not. He therefore
adopts the hypothesis that the common ancestor of the manuscripts was a copy
of Bracton's copy, made by a clerk after Bracton's death. This redactor theory
is not advanced by him as a result of any study of the manuscripts or their
characteristics; he frankly admits that his opinion is based on a study of the
printed texts only. Actually, this theory of the archetype rests primarily on
his belief that Bracton was too good a civilian to have been responsible for
the passages credited to him by the manuscripts. Starting with this belief he
develops his theory of the redactor, and then uses this, not as an hypothesis
but as an established fact, to prove the proposition on which it is itself founded.
The existence of this archetype, which is a necessary basis for most of Dr.
Kantorowicz's emendations, is also the foundation on which he builds his
criticism of MIaitland and Maitland's estimate of Bracton. and on which he
challenges and denies the authority of the manuscripts. The redactor is made
the scapegoat for all the textual difficulties in those few folios of the De Legi-
bus which come under consideration. This copyist is said to have made occa-
sional mistakes of many kinds, but chiefly, and most importantly, he was afflict-
ed with a decided and uncontrollable tendency to perpetrate haplographic
errors. He had a penchant for mistaking a word in one place for a similar
or somewhat similar word in another place, with the result that tile interven-
ing part of the text was omitted. So certain is Dr. Kantorowicz of this out-
standing characteristic of the alleged redactor, that he does not hesitate to
make any change in the text that he deemis desirable, provided that it can be
based on the possibility of a haplographic error on the part of this scribe.
Perhaps for the purpose of making this person seem more real, we are told
that he "must have been more than a mere professional scribe, and less than
an accomplished scholar." 3 The basis on which this estimate of the supposed
copyist is made is not explained, and just how such an evaluation could be
2. P. 97, n. 1.
3. P. 38.
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arrived at is hard to understand. No claim is anywhere made that the clerk
was writing anything of his own into the text; lie is said merely to have at-
tempted to copy, without the addition of any new matter, the original text
before him. Such a purely manual piece of work could show nothing except
his competence as a copyist, and most certainly it could give no indication of
the caliber of his scholarship.. If Dr. Kantorowicz is correct as to the errors
which he says were perpetrated by this man, the latter would seem to have
been, as far as his ability to copy was concerned, even less than a professional
scribe. For the professional scribe, like the modern compositor, could ordi-
narily be counted on to reproduce satisfactorily what was put before him. He
did far better work than the redactor is alleged to have done. If the existence
of the latter could be established, we might be willing to agree-as possibly
explaining how he came by Bracton's own copy of his work-that lie may
have been "a friend, a relative, a colleague of Bracton's, his official clerk or
his private secretary." 4 But until it is proved that there was such a copyist,
it seems hardly profitable to speculate on the identity of what is an as yet
unknown and purely hypothetical person,
The cause of his redactor's shortcomings is put by Dr. Kantorowicz square-
ly on the ground of his having been, psychologically, an unsually poor copy-
ist. An ingrained habit of this sort in any copyist would inevitably affect
all portions of his work, no matter what he happened to be copying, for one
who is constitutionally unable to copy correctly, as it is insisted that the
redactor was unable, would make mistakes whatever the text before him might
be. If the hypothesis of the redactor and his ineradicable failing is a correct
one, the same faults which are attributed to him in his copying of a small Ro-
man law portion of the treatise, should appear also in the many times larger
part devoted to English law. Dr. Kantorowicz's conclusions are based on a
study of what is, at most, a mere fragment of a very long text, and as far as
any evidence that he has brought forward is concerned, those conclusions are
applicable, if at all, to only a few places where Bracton was copying from
Roman law sources. These parts of Bracton's text are peculiar, or unique, in
both character and provenience. In them he is not writing straightforwardly
out of the fullness of his own knowledge about a law which he himself helps to
administer-or even, apparently, out of any fullness of knowledge of Roman
law-but he is largely plagiarizing from the writings of others. He is com-
posing with his eyes on civil law books, especially Azo, which are open before
him-a fact which Dr. Kantorowicz tacitly admits by attempting to emend
what he considers corruptions in these places by reference to the printed edi-
tions of the works from which Bracton was copying. A theory which is based
on material drawn from so small and so abnormal a part of the De Legibus
has little to recommend it as applying to the whole treatise, all the more so
because the textual irregularities at the places where it has been made to apply
are susceptible of other possible explanations which have already been sug-
gested by earlier scholars, such as poor Roman law texts in Bracton's pos-
session, deliberate alteration by him of the texts of his exemplars, lack of ac-




the entire text of Bracton, as we have it, is the work of a copyist with an in-
veterate tendency to lose his place, Dr. Kantorowicz would have at least to
demonstrate that what he calls "nonsense," allegedly resulting from the clerk's
haplography, is to be found throughout the De Lcgitus. and to approximately
the same degree in all portions. He can not do this because, as is well known,
the characteristic defects which he finds in some of the Roman law parts of
the treatise do not appear in that far larger portion on English law.
Dr. Kantorowicz admits this difference between the two sections of text,
and tries to explain it by saying that the copyist "must have been trained in
English law." r This again is mere assertion unsupported by proof. It takes
for granted that there was a redactor, but it proves nothing as to the actual
existence of such a person. Clearly that existence must he proved before one
can be permitted to cite the fact that the English prirtinn is textually of a
far higher quality than the Roman, to prove that the mythical clerk knew Eng-
lish law better than he did civil law. Otherwise the "must have been trained"
is made to account for the difference between the two portions of text and, in
a circle, the fact of that difference is used to prove the "must." In all the cen-
sure which Dr. Kantorowicz has heaped upon the redactor for his copying of
Bracton's text where Bracton himself is drawing on Azo or the Institutes,
not a word has been said about the copyist's knowledge or ignorance of what
he has been copying or of its effect upon his work. He has not been criticized
for the lack of any intellectual competence-as for having copied incorrectly
individual words which were technical or difficult to understand-but only for
having been careless and inattentive, and for having lost his place. As far as
the Roman law parts of the text are concerned, the matter of his knowledge
or ignorance does not at all enter into the argument in favor of a redactor.
Inasmuch as the alleged haplography in one portion of the treatise has been
explained on grounds which do not require any consideration of the scribe's
understanding of what he was copying, a supposed knowledge of English law
on his part can hardly be advanced as a reason for the lack of this same hap-
lography in another portion. The psychological weaknesses and defects which
are said to have been responsible for the faulty first part, and are there
rightly considered as having had no connection with the scribe's comprehen-
sion of the text before him, would have continued to operate until the end of
his task. One who is merely copying the work of another with no intention
of making alterations or additions of his own, is primarily concerned, and
necessarily so, with the task of reproducing with a mechanical fidelity the
exact words of his exemplar rather than with the meaning of what he is copy-
ing. This being so, it is inconceivable that a copyist who was unable to do
any better, on this purely mechanical side, than the redactor is supposed to
have done in the civil law parts of the treatise, should ever have reached, in
the course of producing a single book, the high standard of copying he must
necessarily have attained to have also been responsible for the English law
portion.
Even for those parts of the text of the De Legibus which Dr. Kantorowicz
considers, plausibilit-y, which he is fond of stressing, does not in any way coun-
stitute proof of his assertion. That to him such tmendations as "quasi [Et
5. Ibid.
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competunt ex contractu vel quasi], cum . .. ," or "actiones [rei persequendae
causa comparatae sunt, si quidem actiones] sunit .. ," 6 make sense, or bet-
ter sense, or are desirable on other grounds, does not in itself prove the sound-
ness of his belief in a clerk addicted to haplography. At best they are possible
explanations of what might have happened, but by no means necessarily a
proof of what actually did occur. As Dr. Kantorowicz at one place admits,
conjectural emendations, from their very nature, can not be considered as
equivalent to proof; yet all that he brings forward to support his thesis of a
redactor is one conjectural emendation after another, Not a shred of actual
evidence, either internal or external, is produced.
The emendations above, and many others of the same type, have been made,
we are told, with regard to "transcriptional probability." But probability,
transcriptional or otherwise, is not an exact notion. The idea of probability
is controlled too largely by the personal equation to be a reliable guile, since
what may seem probable to one person may seem far from probable to an-
other. Moreover, the writer's idea of transcriptional probability in the case
of his own emendations, is controlled very largely by the printed texts of Azo
and the Krueger and Mommsen edition of the Corpus Juris Civilis. Just what
Bracton's manuscript text was, of either Azo or the Corpus, we do not know.
It may have been very good or very bad or anything in between. But we may
be certain that, to a greater or less extent, it differed from that in the printed
editions. Consequently, only if we had Bracton's own Roman law exemplars
would we be able to speak of transcriptional probability with any convincing
assurance as far as any particular emendation is concerned. For aught we
know, many of the readings in the Roman law part of Bracton's text which
fail to agree with the editions may have been in the manuscripts from which
he copied. Even the alleged haplographic passages might be explained on the
same basis. For as the author has gone to some pains to point out, haplography
is a more or less common result of scribal copying and is not limited to copy-
ists of any one time or tongue. It is found not only in all types of manuscripts
on every conceivable subject, but, to some extent, in every individual manu-
script. So even if Dr. Kantorowicz is correct in the matter of the haplography
which he claims to discover in those special sections of the treatise where
Bracton, as all scholars agree, was plagiarizing from Azo, that haplography
may have existed originally in the Azo manuscript which Bracton was using,
and from it have been reproduced in his own text. Dr. Kantorowicz's argu-
ment in favor of transcriptional probability is based throughout on two prin-
cipal assumptions: first, that the texts of Bracton's Roman exemplars were
in agreement with our modern printed texts of the same works, and second,
that Bracton in using them at all verbatim intended to copy, and did so copy,
just what was in those manuscripts-and this despite the well known fact that
Bracton frequently altered, or even omitted, portions of the Roman text at
places where he was for the most part copying verbatim. Because we know
nothing as to the textual condition of his manuscript Roman law books, or
of his intended, or actual, manipulation of their contents at any particular
place, it would seem anything but wise deliberately to change Bracton's text
6. P. 100.
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from that which is authorized by the manuscripts, to one which corresponds
to the printed Azo or Institutes.
An additional reason for proceeding cautiously in these matters is pre-
sented by Dr. Kantorowicz himself. He admits, as an indisputable fact, that
Bracton, in copying from the "unreliable compilations" of Azo, would be
inclined "reverently" to reproduce "grammatical and legal inistakes which he
obviously found in his manuscript." 7 Yet when he comes to make his emen-
dations, he altogether loses sight of the implications of this admission, and the
blame for the discrepancies is laid wholly upon the redactor rather than upon
the just as possible faulty manuscripts from which Bracton mny have copied.
Inasmud as we can not be certain that Bracton's exemplars were not de-
fective, there is little point in Dr. Kantorowicz's statement that he is going
to prove the certainty of a redactor, by confining himself to corruptions which
"we have not the right to attribute to Bracton in person . . .because only
an extremely drowsy or careless man could have written them without at least
afterwards correcting them himself." 8 For by his own admission, these cor-
ruptions may have been in the text which Bracton would reproduce, without
correction, in a spirit of unquestioning reverence. In his choice of passages
to prove the actuality of his hypothetical redactor, Dr. Kantorowicz further
says that he is going to "use great caution and circumspection." 1' Therefore
the nine passages which he finally selects may be regarded as the best he can
find to prove his point. Six of them fall within that part of Bracton's text
which is contained in Maitland's Bracton and .Azo. Any profitable discussion
of all the conjectural emendations made in these six passages would involve
a full discussion of the questions-passed over by the author, though weighed
by Maitland and others-as to just how and to what extent and fur what
purposes Bracton intended to use the material he extracted from Azo, and
would consequently, because of its length, be impossible within the limits of a
review. We may, however, be granted the space necessary to discuss, with rea-
sonable detail, the other three passages numbered 2, 7, and 9, which having
been selected on the same basis as the other six, are representative of the group
as a whole.
The first is on fol. 92, where Bracton, after saying that a man must endow
his future wife at the church door, continues, "Non enim valet constitutio facta
in lecto mortali." Dr. Kantorowicz's comments: "The last editor made the
conjecture viaritali only tentatively and buried it in the apparatus, but it is
quite obvious. The scribe was misled to speak of the death bed instead of the
marriage bed because the wife can claim dower only after the death of her
husband, and because the same passage speaks of heirs and succession. The
two words are of course very similar." 1o This is typical of Dr. Kantorowiez's
treatment of the selected passages in general, and characteristic of his facility
for easy explanation. As in his discussion of so many other passages, one
editor or another is criticized, the authority of the manuscripts is considered
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ing as usual the reason for the redactor's mistake-are made with an assur-
ance and air of finality which, backed by the author's reputation as a scholar,
are most persuasively convincing. The great difference between this and most
of the other attempts at explanation made by Dr. Kantorowicz, is that here we
have the opportunity to test the validity of the explanation by actual facts.
The result is not such as to inspire us with confidence in the certainty of the
many other assertions of the same type which it would be impossible for one
either to prove or disprove. Actually, the last editor gave the reading mortali
in the text, indicated by "Sic, MSS." in the apparatus that such was the read-
ing of the manuscripts, and then queried the reading maritali, which had al-
ready been insisted on by others who had commented on the passage. Just why
Dr. Kantorowicz should regard this emendation, as so many of his others, as
obvious does not appear. He may have been influenced by the vel in camera
which follows the mortali, but the fact of association with a chamber is no
more a characteristic of the marriage bed than of the death bed. Maritali as a
permissible reading is excluded by the very definition of dos as given earlier in
this same folio, for dos is said to be something bestowed by the man on the
woman propter nuptiacs futuras and ante desponsationem in initio contractus.
That is, the man must endow the woman he is going to wed before the mar-
riage takes place. But nmritali could mean only that the marriage had already
occurred. There would have been no point at all in Bracton saying that the
woman could not be endowed on the marriage bed, when only two lines pre-
viously he had said that she must be endowed before marriage. But, on the
other hand, there would be no repetition of statement in saying that she could
not be endowed in lecto mortali. What Bracton clearly had in mind was the
situation where a man on his death bed, and according to the regular practice,
attempts to endow the woman before the espousal. The mortali of the manu-
scripts is most surely correct, and we can be certain, notwithstanding Dr.
Kantorowicz's strong insistence to the contrary, that his redactor did not
make a mistake at this point because of the similarity of two words. We can-
not recall having seen the expression in lecto maritali employed in connection
with the subject of common law dower. The phrases in lecto suo nmortali and
the equivalent in suo lecto aegritudinis are met with frequently. In suo lecto
nzortali, again with reference to the place where a woman has been endowed,
will be found in Bracton at fol. 304, this time in a writ. Two cases in the Note
Book, nos. 1875 and 1895, convey the information desponsavit Matillidcm
uxorem suam in lecto suo mortali, and non desponsavit . . . sed tantum fiden
dedit in lecto suo mortali. Case 1718 in the same book has the defending
party in an action for dower say that the woman ought not to have dower,
because non fuit desponsata nisi in lecto suo in egritudine sua unde obiit. In
the margin, directly opposite this, is a note in almost the very same words
that Dr. Kantorowicz would emend on fol. 92-Nota quod non valet doris con-
stitutio in lecto mortali . . . . The practical point of law involved in the in
lecto mortali, a point which Dr. Kantorowicz in his comment misses alto-
gether, is a most important one; namely, that a woman who marries a man
on his death bed cannot claim the common law right of dower after his death.
Her constitutio dotis, though made before her marriage, will be of no avail
because the formalities have not taken place publicly at the church door.
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The second passage is found on fol. 147. %s given in the manuscripts it
reads, "Olim quidem corruptores virginitatis et castitatis et eorum fautores,
cum nec. . . ." The first edition has suspcndt', antur after castitatis. Dr.
Kantorowicz states that the first editor "added" suspendebantur, and that the
other editors "accepted this emendation without questioning it." "t Now it
would be quite impossible for one to say with knowledge that the word was
"added" by the first editor, for there is nothing in the way that it is printed
that marks it as an emendation, or that distinguishes it from the words that
precede or follow it. As far as can be determined, the sixteenth century editor
seems to have made no emendations in his text, or to have inserted anything
without some manuscript authority. At one place Dr. Kantorowicz refers to
"the" manuscript used by the first editor, but the complete collation of many
manuscripts now makes it certain that that editor made, as stated in his pre-
face, a comparison of several manuscript texts. That was nearly four hun-
dred years ago, and in some manuscript, which could easily have disappeared
in the interval since then, he may well have found the suspendcbantiur. It is
the type of insertion which the early users of the De Legibus often made in
their manuscript copies. That the word itself is historically incorrect, does
not do away with the probability of its manuscript origin, for the medieval
lawyer was often woefully weak on his legal history. On this very matter of
rape and its penalty, suspendebantur as an error is matched, or even sur-
passed, by the inaccuracy of as great a lawyer as Thorpe--later a C. J.--who
in 1342 could be so far wrong as to say that rape "was only a trespass at
common law." All things considered, it seems more likely than not that the
suspendebantur came from some manuscript source. Certainly there is no evi-
dence to support the assertion that it was added by the first editor.
Nor did the last editor, as Dr. Kantorowicz claims, accept the word without
questioning it. On the possibility that the editor of the first edition may have
had some manuscript authority for it, the word was put in square brackets in
the text, and in the footnotes the information was given that the word was not
found in the manuscripts but came only from the 1569 edition. Although Dr.
Kantorowicz maintains that suspendebantar as a predicate is out of place, and
that the verb should come, and in Bracton's copy did come, after far tores, it is
submitted that a verb would be grammatically correct at either place. It is the
emendation rather than grammar that demands a verb after fautores. The
sentence is not a very close recasting of the one in Justinian's Code 9. 13. 1.,
beginning Raptores virginum. Dr. Kantorowicz admits, as of course he must,
that "what Bracton precisely had written we have no means of knowing," 12
yet in spite of this, and on the basis of an alleged omission due to haplography,
he makes the text read, "fautorcs [capite puniebantur ut raptores]". These
words are wholly fanciful on his part; they do not occur in Code 9. 13. 1 or
involve the usual question of transcriptional probability. They are only one of
many combinations of words, all with haplographic possibilities, which could be
used at this same place to bring out the same idea. The lack of a predicate in
this passage justifies a comment, but it does not justify a tampering with the
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From the fact that the manuscripts give no verb at all, the intrinsic proba-
bility would seem to be that Bracton never wrote one, either through inad-
vertence or because he left a space to be filled in after he had assured himself
as to the ancient penalty for rape. This latter possibility, strange though it
may seem, would be quite in keeping with what has happened at other points
in the text. There are places at which, for reasons not clear, other verbs have
been omitted, and there are still other places where it is plain that Bracton
deliberately left blank spaces in his manuscript for matters he intended to look
up before committing himself in writing. The largest spaces are those
which have been left for certain writs which he promises to give, but the forms
of which he seems to have been for the moment unable to remember. That
these empty places were not later filled in would seem to indicate that he did
little work towards rectifying omissions in his text, once he had written it.
In the process of copying and recopying, most of these gaps in the great ma-
jority of the manuscripts have been filled up, but in one or another of the
earlier copies, at one place or another, though not always in the same places,
spaces up to twenty-five lines in extent have been left for the promised inser-
tions. Because Bracton had this habit of leaving what were meant to be tem-
porary gaps at points where he was momentarily uncertain as to actual facts
or forms, there is always present, in such a case as that before us which in-
volves a matter of historical fact, at least the possibility that the omission may
be due to an original hiatus which was never filled in and which disappeared
in the process of successive copyings. The alteration of the text at this point
has little to commend it, both because it is far from certain that this particu-
lar passage ever had a predicate-either at the place where the author puts
it or anywhere else-and because the suggested emendation has no basis that
is substantial and positive enough to make its acceptance imperative.
The third passage occurs on fol. 162b. Dr. Kantorowicz says that the text
as handed down by the, manuscripts "hardly makes sense." We are compelled
to disagree most emphatically with this statement. Bracton reads, "Item cum
procurator generalis armatus venerit, et ipse dominus videtur armis delecisse,
sive hoc mandaverit sive ratum habuerit. Et hoc quidem erit dicendum in fa-
milia, cum familia armata venerit. Ego non videor venisse armatus sed
fainilia, nisi iussi vel ratum habui." The hoc in the second sentence refers, of
course, to what has just been stated in the first-the same thing that has been
said relative to the procurator when he shall have come armed, must be said
in regard to the familia when the latter shall have come armed. It is altogether
clear from the context that the dominus has had no active participation in the
act, all he does is to order it or ratify it; he does not accompany either the
procurator in the one case or the familia in the other. Moreover, there was
no need for Bracton's inserting anything more in the text to bring out this
point, especially since the "I shall not be deemed to have come armed" still
further necessarily implies my non-participation in the coming of the Jamilia,
inasmuch as the statement would not be true if I had taken part in their act.
Therefore the emendation suggested by Dr. Kantorowicz, "venerit, ego non,
[ego non] videor" is not only unnecessary, but actually superfluous in adding
nothing to the meaning which the text already has without it. If the text
"hardly makes sense" without the added ego non, it continues to make the
same sense with it inserted.
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It may be added, parenthetically, that this is the second time in the nine
selected passages that Bracton's text has been deliberately changed to mahe
it conform more closely to the text of the printed Digest. In neither case has
the alteration changed the sense of the passage. In both cases there can be no
valid objection, on the score of either language or sense, to the text as given
in the manuscripts. In number five of the passages facinoribts has been urged
as an emendation for factionibus, because the former is the reading found in
the Digest. As a matter of fact, in this particular context the words are synony-
mous. Factionibus in a medieval work is entitled to its medieval meaning. In
medieval Latin factio, as facihnr in classical Latin, may mean either deed or,
in a more special sense, misdeed. One of the many definitions of factio found
in Du Cange is given in terms of fachius: "Facinus pravum, delictum." Such
altogether unnecessary alteration of a text which is perfectly sound as it
stands, is unwarranted from any point of view.
The [ego non] is found in the emendation because Dr. Kantorowicz has
come to suspect any passage in Bracton from Roman law exemplars which
does not agree with the printed text of those exemplars, and because of his
conviction that these "corruptions" in Bracton's text must be laid to the hap-
lographic errors of the redactor. Bracton was copying from Digest 43. 16. 3.
11 which, after the sentence about the procurator, reads, "Hoe et in familia
dicendum est: nam cum familia sine me armata venit, ego non videor venisse,
sed familia, nisi iussi vel ratum habui." It will be seen that Bracton, although
he keeps closely to the rest of the Roman text, has omitted the sine 21C. It is
this omission which leads our emendator to insert the wholly uncalled for ego
non, although Bracton, by using two sentences for the Digest's one, has made
a slight variation in the exact wording of the Roman law text sufficient to
bring out the very idea of the latter without using the sine me. The only
fault which has been found with this sentence in Bracton is that it does not
make sense, but the only actual difference between it and the corresponding
sentence in the Digest is that it omits the sine ine. This being so, the logical
thing would be for Dr. Kantoroicz to follow the procedure which he has
adopted at so many other places, and insert a sine me in Bracton's text. The
principle of transcriptional probability, which he says governs all his emenda-
tions, would hardly allow him to do otherwise. He will not do so, however,
because "to insert simply sine me would not explain the corruption." 1a This
statement is not true unless the words "as a haplographic error" are added.
It is to explain the alleged corruption as haplographic that the emendator goes
contrary to all that he has preached and practiced before, and, instead of add-
ing the obvious sine me at the point where it occurs in the Digest, inserts the
equivalent ego non at the place it must occupy if the redactor is to be charged
with having made one of his usual mistakes.
There is no "corruption" at this point in Bracton's book. His text as it
stands not only makes sense, but the meaning is perfectly clear and plain,
namely, when my familia shall have come armed, their act shall not be im-
puted to me unless I have ordered it in the first place or have ratified it later.
This is certainly the sense in which one of Bracton's contemporaries took it.
13. P. 48.
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To Fleta, who copied it into his treatise, it meant plainly enough, "Hoc idem
dicendum erit in familia, cum ipsa venerit armata. Et quo casu non videor
esse armatus, sed ipsa familia, nisi hoc iussi vel ratum habui." Here again the
manuscripts, rather than their calumniator, unquestionably give the correct
reading.
Dr. Kantorowicz is likewise hardly correct when he says, "It does not seen]
to have been noticed that the whole section has been compiled from the title
of the Digest 'De vi et de vi armata,' 43, 16." 14 This fact has been well known
since at least as early as 1862, when Gifiterbock commented on the connection
in his Henricus de Bracton und sein Veriiltniss zin r~nischen Rechis.
As far as the passages we have just considered are concerned, Dr. Kantoro-
wicz has been anything but successful in fulfilling his promise to prove his
thesis of a redactor by selecting, "only corruptions we have positive [sic] rea-
sons to ascribe to the clerk because they can be explained as misreadings of the
correct text." 15 He has, however, been fully successful in demonstrating the
truth of a fact which all of us at times have difficulty in keeping clearly in
mind-the fact that an explanation, however plausible it may seem or however
strongly it may be asserted, is not necessarily also the explanation.
The discussion of Bracton as a civilian begins with a statement of the well
known fact that "everything that regards the romanist and romanesque por-
tions of the De Legibus has been a matter of dispute among the greatest au-
thorities." 16 More particularly at issue have been the questions of the extent
of Bracton's civil law learning, and his understanding, or misunderstanding,
of his Roman law texts and Azo. As a matter of fact, all the Roman law parts
of Bracton's book are neither consistently good nor consistently poor, yet
most scholars have accepted both good and bad as having come from Bracton.
Dr. Kantorowicz, on the other hand, is willing to accept the authority of the
manuscripts only for those passages which tend to support his belief that
Bracton was a learned civilian, and repudiates the manuscripts' authority when
they insist on readings which other scholars have accepted as evidence that
Bracton was not deeply learned in Roman law. He exculpates Bracton in the
matter of these readings at the expense of the supposed redactor; he attributes
to the English judge a wide knowledge of Roman law, and great ability in
using it and adapting it to his purpose. He does not, however, wish "to declare
Bracton a learned civilian by the high standards and on the model of the
Italians." 17
The section on Maitland versus Bracton is quite the longest single portion
of the whole book. In 1895 Maitland edited for the Selden Society his Brac-
ton and Azo. This is a detailed study of the first ten folios of Bracton's text-
much of which was taken largely verbatim from Azo or the Institutes-and of
the text of parts of Bracton's De Actionibus (fols. 98b-106b, 112-115), some
portions of which were borrowed from the same Roman sources. Dr. Kantoro-







by Maitland in this book. In contrast to the estimate of Bracton held by this
critic, Maitland regarded Bracton as having been "a poor and uninstructed
Romanist," who did not thoroughly understand Roman law. As a result Dr.
Kantorowicz condemns Maitland for not understanding Bracton, along much
the same lines that Maitland condemned Bracton for not understanding Azo.
Maitland's vast knowledge in regard to things Bractonian is admitted anti
acknowledged. He is said to have committed only one mistake, "but a funda-
mental one, from which all his others, without exception, are derived. He did
not see that Bracton's text has come down to us from one archetype." 18 To
just what extent Maitland should be blamed for not recognizing the existence
of a conjectural and hypothetical redactor is a rather nice question. Maitland
believed, as have all other scholars who have considered the matter except Dr.
Kantorowicz, that the text of the De Legibus in the extant manuscripts came
from Bracton's own copy of his work and that the fundamental mistakes in the
Roman law parts were perpetuations of mistakes made in that copy. He start-
ed with the premise that the text as we have it is Bracton's; Dr. Kantoro-
wicz with the premise that Bracton was a learned civilian. Both agree that the
text of some parts of the Roman portions of the work was not that which a
learned civilian would have written. Maitland's conclusion is that Bracton
was not a learned civilian; Dr. Kantorowicz's, that the text was not Brac-
ton's. Maitland's position would seem to be the stronger, for prima facie the
text in the manuscripts is Bracton's. This inference may be rebutted, but only
by actual evidence to the contrary. Dr. Kantorowicz has brought forward no
such evidence to prove that the manuscripts do not contain Bracton's own
text; he merely asserts that they do not. Maitland's conjectures are based not
upon another and unproven conjecture, but upon the very substantial and
proven fact that the text readings which are under fire are firmly supported
by the manuscripts. With the manuscripts solidly against him, Dr. Kantoro-
wicz certainly has no more ground for insisting that the original text was with-
out errors, than Maitland had for maintaining the contrary.
Moreover, and this point can not be overemphasized, it is only in a few
places, where Bracton was copyiig directly from exemplars which themselves
may well have been corrupt, that Dr. Kantorowicz has found anything to
make it seem plausible to him that a redactor may have "jumped as usual
from constituit . . . to constituit" or have made other similar mistakes. Nor
d,,es the attempt to exonerate Bracton by using the theory of the redactor
answer satisfactorily many of the criticisms raised by Maitland in Bracton
and Azo. Until the faultlessness of Bracton's original text is established, Dr.
Kantorowicz can hardly hope to refute Maitland by asserting, without proof,
that that text was perfect, and then using a series of conjectural emendations,
based on the assumption of that undemonstrated perfectness, to prove the
actuality of the redactor. AlU things considered, the theory of the archetype
is too tenuous to make a copyist, habitually given to haplography, seem a more
probable explanation of Bracton's poor showing in this part of his text, than
that of poor Roman law exemplars or Bracton's nwn manipulation of their
texts, as suggested by Maitland and others. In one place Maitland's opiniun
is. P. 80.
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as to the reason for a certain reading is said to have been "the unfortunate
effect of a prejudice which by now must have become inveterate." 10 It may
well be doubted, however, if any reader of the two books will consider Mait-
land, in any of his conclusions, more obsessed with the idea of Bracton as an
uninstructed Romanist, than Dr. Kantorowicz is with his theory of a redac-
tor and archetype. Although he has warned others that "in textual criticism
nothing is certain except the inevitability of error," 20 Dr. Kantorowicz insists
on the correctness of his emendations and the soundness of his own opinions,
as opposed to those of Maitland. Since most, if not all, of the matters on
which he differs from Maitland are not susceptible of either proof or dis-
proof, it is difficult to share Dr. Kantorowicz's enthusiastic certainty as to the
impregnability of his own conclusions, which has led him dogmatically to
override those of Maitland.
In his last section Dr. Kantorowicz asks for a new edition of Bracton.
Without reserve he condemns as altogether unsatisfactory the plan used in
editing the last edition-of which he had seen only the first two volumes.
That plan deliberately excluded extraneous matter of any kind from the vol-
umes which contained the text. The aim of the editor, as fully expressed in
the preface to the second volume, was to produce not necessarily the "best"
text from the point of view of law or language, but "to present, as nearly as
may be, the text of the De Legibus as it finally left Bracton's hands." 21 That
text was to be based on the weight of manuscript authority as represented
by the three main text traditions found in the-extant manuscripts. The read-
er was warned that "the readings which on the authority of the MSS. must
be accepted as Bracton's own, are not always what, from the context, we might
expect or desire." 22 Because of the widely divergent views of scholars as to
the reason for the poor state of some parts of the Roman portion of the text,
it was deemed inadvisable to meddle deliberately with that text as given by the
manuscripts. It was expressly pointed out that "it has seemed preferable to
discuss troublesome readings in the commentary, rather than on insufficient
manuscript authority to alter them in the text." 23 The historical apparatus
was also to appear in this volume of commentary, along with such other mat-
ter as would normally be included at such a place. But Dr. Kantorowicz is
not willing to accept this arrangement of the material, contending that the
plan was fundamentally wrong. He blames the editor for having reproduced
the exact text of the manuscripts, and insists that the readings which were not
acceptable should have been emended in passing and that the historical and
all critical apparatus should have accompanied the text. He complains that
the necessity of consulting another volume, apart from that of the text, to get
this additional information makes the work too unwieldy and cumbersome-
by implication decrying the plan of a commentary, which would still have to
19. P. 92.
20. P. 132.





be consulted by a reader even though the apparatuses were given with the
text.
There are other criticisms of a lesser sort, some of which can be explained
on the basis of personal preference, but some of which are not easy to under-
stand. Thus the editor is taken to task for not following the exact notation
used by Maitland in the case of some manuscripts, and in another place he
is censured for using the identical system of notation which Maitland em-
ployed for these manuscripts. At another place it is said that the use of this
system in the critical apparatus conveys little to the reader, as the manu-
scripts "are not arranged by groups or any other rational criterion." Actu-
ally, as again carefully explained in the preface to the second volume, the manu-
scripts from which the text was derived were selected as representing the
three text traditions and are grouped according to those traditions. This
procedure, which does not appear rational to Dr. K1antorowicz, allows the
reader not only to see the basis on which the text is constructed, but also,
if he so desires, to reconstruct the text of each or any of the traditions. The
criticism that the graphs, employed to represent relationship as regards the
pedigree of the manuscripts, are "bewildering" because no explanation of them
is given anywhere, seems strange in view of the fifty pages in the first vol-
ume, where the diagrams occur, devoted to explaining in detail the relation-
ships of the manuscripts with which each graphic illustration is concerned.
It is difficult to see either the cause or the value of the censure that the edi-
tion contains a "certainly unauthentic calendar of rubrics." The editor in his
preface was careful to forestall the necessity of just that criticism by pointing
out that as far as Bracton was concerned, the rubrics might not be authentic:
"A word of explanation is demanded by the rubrics. Whether or not Brac-
ton himself wrote the rubrics, and whatever may have been their position and
importance in the original MS., all the MSS. now extant have them. There-
fore in reproducing this feature we are making the text appear as it must prac-
tically always have appeared to users of Bracton MSS. from the beginning." 2
The very practical reason for not giving variant readings with the rubrics-
another cause of complaint-was also made clear in the same place.
Most difficult of all to understand is the criticism that the last edition is
based on "the utterly corrupt text of the extant MSS." 25 Obviously the text
of Bracton, or of any other medieval writer, must be founded on such manu-
scripts of that text as are now in existence, notwithstanding such defects as
the manuscripts themselves may have. Incidentally, we would take issue with
the "utterly." It is a very strong word; too strong, we venture to say, to be
applied without reservations to even that small part of the text which comes
within the limits of Dr. Kantorowicz's study, even though it is the least com-
mendable part of the treatise textually. For the other portions of the text,
the state of the manuscripts compares favorably with that of other medieval
manuscripts which have been many times copied and recopied.
In a paragraph, which from its position and change of style reminds one
curiously enough of an addicio in Bracton, it is said to be "intolerable that the
24. Id. at ix.
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most important literary source of English legal history should further be ob-
structed and defiled." 26 To have any point, this charge of obstruction and de-
filement can rightly be levelled only at the extant manuscripts, for all three
editions of the De Legibus have contained only the text as found in those
manuscripts, without the addition of anything new or extraneous. Such defile-
ment as may be found in the printed texts has come from the manuscripts
themselves. This implies that the new edition which is advocated should not
follow the manuscripts as the other editions hhve done, but should take such
liberties with their texts as the future editors deem desirable. And this is just
what Dr. Kantorowicz advises the editors to do.
Because some material from Roman and Romanesque sources, and even
less from canonical and theological sources, is to be found in the treatise, which
is mainly pure English law, he contends that no single person is competent to
produce a suitable edition. Two or three editors, each familiar with a different
field, would be required. The text would be based not on the authority of
the various traditions as established by a pedigree of the manuscripts-which
now universally recognized practice Dr. Kantorowicz explicitly repudiates-
but on the "best" manuscript, "that is, the one least disfigured by what are
obviously mere scribal errors." 27 Just how this best manuscript is to be se-
lected from the half a hundred extant manuscripts, or how the scribal errors
of successive scribes and generations are to be distinguished from each other
and from the true text-without the aid of a pedigree and a knowledge of
text traditions-we are not told. This "best" text is to be collated with other
texts whose number or method of selection is not explained. From the result-
ing variant readings, those which seem "most probably correct" to the per-
son who happens to be the editor, would be selected, and when none of the
texts contain a "probable" reading, the text would be emended. In other
words, probability, as gauged by the individual fancy of the editor, would be
substituted for the authority of the manuscripts.
In the matter of emendations, the editors should be "courageous enough to
make many, and if necessary, daring conjectures." 28 The general principle
of the type of conjectural emendation recommended, and the extent to which
it migtit be used, is illustrated by Dr. Kantorowicz's handling of a passage
on fol. 102. In a short space of ten lines of text as originally printed, he gives
us five emendations,20 four of them lengthy ones based on the supposed hap-
lography of the hypothetical redactor, who here shows himself incapable of
copying more than two and one-half lines without skipping, on an average,
a block of six words. The first emendation is said to be "desirable on stylistic
grounds"; the second is "indispensible," and is "justified like the three next
ones on the ground of haplography"; the third is based on Institutes 4. 6. 17;
the fourth, "not precisely necessary, but plausible for symmetry's sake," is
based on a corresponding passage on fol. 102b; the fifth, "which is not very







actions into real and personal actions." The character of a text constructed
on these principles, instead of on the textual authority of the manuscripts would
depend largely upon the scholastic idiosyncrasies of the particular editors. In
any case it would differ greatly from the text of the former editions, and also
differ greatly from the text to be found in any of the manuscripts. To what
extent it would even approximately approach the text as Bracton wrote it can
only be surmised. Whatever else may be said for the procedure advocated,
there would seem to be no surer way of causing Bracton's text to be "fur-
ther obstructed and defiled."
There are a number of misleading or incorrect statements in this bouk, two
of which seem to be of importance enough to merit comment. One is in a
passage devoted to a discussion of emendations where it is said that, "in
Bracton's case the necessary conjectures are much safer than usual, as he in
great part only copied or paraphrased known texts of Roman or English law
and legal literature." 30 This statement is so far from exact that it is difficult to
account for it, except on the supposition that the writer mas assuming that
the few folios of Roman or Romanesque material which he had examined and
was discussing, were representative of the whole treatise. Civil law influence
shows itself in Bracton in various ways and in many different parts of the
treatise. But the places at which Bracton can be said "only to have copied or
paraphrased" Roman law texts, do not amount, even on the most generous
estimate, to over a tenth of the Dc Legibus. Bracton's predecessor as a text
writer in the field of English law had been Glanvill. Although some of the
material in Glanvill finds it way into the later work, Bracton's manipulation
of this material results less in a direct copy, or even a paraphrase, than an am-
plification of the points in Glanvill with additional matter of his own-as any
one who has tried to collate the same passage in the two texts will testify.
Glanvil's treatise is so small when compared with Bracton's bulky book, that
even if the latter had used more of Glanvill than he did, it would not have
affected the originality of his work as a whole.
As part of the profuse praise bestowed upon everything pertaining to Brac-
ton, we are at one place informed that his handwriting "was just what was
to be expected: lucid, harmonious, and powerful." 31 As proof of this, in a
footnote, reference is made to a published photograph in which the word volo,
"his" volo it is called, is to be seen in the margin of a plea roll, Curia Regis
Roll no. 72. In Bracton's Note Book, cases nos. 80-124 have been copied from
the Hilary and Easter cases on this roll. Of these Note Book cases, 21 in
Hilary term and 11 in Easter term have been marked on the roll with the
word volo. It has been assumed that volo was written by Bracton as a direc-
tion to some clerk to copy into the Note Book the cases so marked. How
slight the ground for this assumption is may be seen by consulting the entire
text of Curia Regis Roll no. 72, as published in the eighth volume of the
Curia Regis Rolls. For Hilary term, 42 of the cases on the roll are marked
with a volo, of which a scattered one-half of these are to be found in the Note
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are in the Note Book. This means that considerably less than half of all the
volo marked cases on the roll appear in the Note Book, though we should
expect all of them to be there if they had been thus marked for inclusion by
the man for whom the Note Book was made. Again, if volo had been Bracton's
direction to his clerk to copy a case, how shall we explain not only why that
clerk failed to copy more than half of these cases, but also how he came to
insert from the same roll 13 other cases which had no directing volo? More-
over, even if it could be proved that this particular volo had been written by
Bracton, it could hardly be used as an illustration of the normal writing which
he would regularly employ. For volo is written in unusually large letters with
smooth-running lead crayon or pencil, and not with the far differently oper-
ated quill and ink which would be used in writing a book or document. Unless
some of the many marginal notes, in different hands and by different persons,
which are to be found in the Note Book are in Bracton's writing-a matter
on which the editor of the Note Book wisely refused actually to commit him-
self-there is, as far as is known, no specimen of Bracton's normal handwrit-
ing in ink in existence.
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